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I. Introduction 
 
Do automated or artificial intelligence systems follow the law? What 
design choices can the law make to encourage legal compliance by 
robots? Tax law has some experience with these questions. 
 
This Essay describes experience with algorithmic tax compliance 
robots, such as TurboTax or H&R Block Online. It argues that tax 
compliance robots sometimes follow the law and sometimes break the 
law. In the current environment, these results mostly emerge from 
market incentives, since tax compliance robots generally have not been 
charged with direct liability for legal violations.   
 
Tax compliance robots are useful targets for law because of their 
centralized implementation of legal decisions. Influencing how a tax 
compliance robot applies the law can affect many taxpayers at once. 
But the legal design choices might be different in different situations. 
 
Algorithmic tax compliance robots, such as TurboTax, have long 
implemented the tax law using systems that make centralized legal 
decisions without direct user control. These robots generally follow the 
government’s interpretation of the substantive tax law. But they appear 
to break other laws, like taxpayer confidentiality protections and other 
taxpayer data protections required by the Free File agreement with the 
IRS. They also do little to encourage taxpayer honesty. 
 
Marketplace incentives explain this difference. Sometimes, following 
the law increases the profit or revenue of a tax compliance robot like 
TurboTax. Sometimes, breaking the law increases such a robot’s profit 
or revenue. 
   
For instance, tax compliance robots rarely bear direct legal liability for 
mistakes of substantive tax law (despite advertised guarantees). But 
they say that substantive tax law mistakes will produce adverse market 
reaction, such as a loss of customers and revenue. They appear to 
avoid providing taxpayers with overly favorable positions. Instead, 
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they prepare tax returns in a way that minimizes the risk of 
government audit.   
 
On the other hand, tax compliance robots refuse responsibility for 
users’ factual inputs. Some software design features may subtly 
encourage lies, for instance the underreporting of income or the 
overreporting of deductions. There appears to be no mechanism, 
market or otherwise, that imposes costs on, say, Credit Karma when 
the users of Credit Karma lie.  
 
Tax compliance robots also appear to violate laws relating to their use 
of taxpayer data, including requirements found in the so-called “Free 
File” agreement with the IRS. Under this agreement, tax compliance 
software companies agree to provide free filing services to many 
taxpayers. But pending class action lawsuits as well as lawsuits 
brought by the state of California charge Intuit and H&R Block with 
illegal upselling and other violations.1  
 
Part II of this Essay first notes that tax compliance robots are 
centralized sources of legal decisions. Their business models are 
characterized by economies of scale. As others have also observed, 
this makes tax compliance robots an important feature of the modern 
U.S. tax system and a promising target for regulation. Because 
centralization makes enforcement easier, it should encourage tax 
compliance robots to follow the law – although it appears that they do 
so only sometimes.  
 
Part III illustrates how tax compliance robots follow the substantive 
tax law in easy cases and in hard cases. In easy cases, they often 
incorporate government guidance verbatim. In hard cases, robots 
appear to choose solutions that minimize audit risk. 
 
Part IV explains that market incentives can play out in different ways 
for different issues of legal compliance. Sometimes market incentives 
 
 
 
 
1 See infra notes 23-24. 
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encourage legal violations by aligning a tax compliance robot against 
both the government and the taxpayer, as in the case of taxpayer data 
violations. Sometimes, the market encourages legal violations through 
the tacit cooperation of the tax compliance robot and the user, as in the 
case of user fraud. Sometimes, the market may produce 
overcompliance with the law, as when it encourages a tax compliance 
robot to adopt risk-averse interpretations of substantive tax law.  
 
II. Centralization and Economies of Scale 
 
a. Centralization and Tax Compliance Robots: Prior Work 
 
Prior study of tax compliance robots has revealed several themes. One 
question relates to whether tax compliance robots reduce taxpayer time 
and effort required to file.2 Another strand of inquiry relates to whether 
tax compliance robots support greater complexity in the tax law.3 
Another theme deals with the more general possibility that automation 
will shift resources to capital investment as compared to human 
capital, and thus exacerbate the existing tax system’s tendency to 
undertax capital relative to labor.4 
 
This essay relates most directly to yet another issue raised in previous 
scholarship about tax compliance robots. This theme has to do with 
such robots’ legal decisions. In other words, how should the law shape 
and direct the centralized legal decisions made by such robots, and 
how should it address mistakes made when robots get the law wrong? 
Tax compliance robots are a promising target for legal interventions. 
 
 
 
 
2 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to Simplify Individual Tax Filing, 61 NAT’L 
TAX J. 773, 774 (2008) (noting simplification advantage of reducing taxpayer filing costs and 
particular advantage of government-prepared returns); John L. Guyton, et al., The Effects of 
Tax Software and Paid Preparers on Compliance Costs, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 439, 446 (2005) 
(finding based on survey data that tax software decreased compliance costs relative to using a 
paid preparer and that “the net reduction in compliance burdens depends on how one values 
taxpayers’ time”).  
3 Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 91, 
92 (2010) (arguing that the capacity of computer software programs facilitates unprecedented 
computational complexity in the tax law).   
4 See, e.g., Orly Mazur, Taxing the Robots; 46 PEPP. L. REV. 277 (2019); Jay A. Soled & 
Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Automation and the Income Tax, 10 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1 (2018). 
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In many cases, if “the government induces [tax compliance robots] to 
modify their ... software, users have no choice about whether to adopt 
this modification or not.” 5  
 
This essay focuses on tax compliance robots that are algorithmic, 
meaning that they execute a series of programmed instructions. 
TurboTax and similar programs use programmed logic to produce tax 
law results. Some emerging tax compliance robots feature more 
advanced machine learning and artificial intelligence technology,6 
which may present additional concerns about explainability and 
transparency.7  
 
But even a compliance robot built on mere algorithms or programmed 
logic, rather than on machine learning or artificial intelligence, 
presents a special opportunity for the law. Centralization should assist 
enforcement,8 relative to a system populated by many human tax 
preparers. The reason is that the government is more likely to discover 
an error if it is repeated across many returns. The prediction does not 
require the government to marshal artificial intelligence tools or other 
 
 
 
 
5 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 106 (1st ed. 1999) 
(identifying “closed code” as a good target for regulation because it is “unmovable, and 
unmoving”).  
6 These include Blue J Legal, which uses machine learning techniques to apply case law 
precedent to users’ fact situations and predict how a court would decide between employee 
and independent contractor classification, or how a court would decide whether a transaction 
had economic substance. See Benjamin Alarie, et al., Using Machine Learning to Predict 
Outcomes in Tax Law, at 1 (Dec. 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855977) (describing the Blue J Legal 
project). Other work has sought to translate the Code’s natural language into a “default logic 
representation.” See Marcos Pertierra, Sarah Lawsky, Erik Hemberg & Una-May O’Reilly, 
Parsing Statute Law as Default Logic Through Automatic Semantic Parsing, PROCEEDINGS OF 
ASAIL 2017. Perhaps future creative artificial intelligence systems might search for new tax 
shelters using the primary source material of the Internal Revenue Code. 
7 See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2019) (arguing that law can nevertheless address such explainability 
concerns). 
8 The general assumption is that compliance with the law is a good thing. Considering whether 
compliance is a bad thing because the law is imperfect or wrong falls outside the scope of this 
paper.   
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cutting edge technology.9 It is simply an observation that more 
identical mistakes are more likely to be detected. 
 
Some prior work recommends leveraging tax compliance robots’ 
central role to help increase user take-up of programs like the earned 
income tax credit.10 Other work suggests fixing common mistakes in 
the implementation of software compliance programs by auditing or 
directly requiring changes in the decisions made by tax compliance 
robots.11 Another line of research considers the use of tax compliance 
robots to increase user honesty through programming tweaks.12  
 
Other recommendations would explicitly extend “tax preparer”13 
requirements to tax compliance robots.14 Similarly, “Circular 230” 
 
 
 
 
9 See generally Bryan Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial 
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2004) 
(noting that a provision of the 1998 Act, codified at I.R.C. § 7612, prevents the IRS from 
obtaining source code software in most cases).  
10 See, e.g., Jacob Goldin, Tax Benefit Complexity and Take-Up: Lessons from the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, 72 TAX L. REV. 59, 95 (2018) (arguing that “assisted preparation methods” 
reduce the user’s exposure to “tax benefit complexity” on issues such as the earned income tax 
credit).  
11 See infra sources cited at notes 53-55 (describing recommendations of the National 
Taxpayer Advocate). 
12 See Joseph Bankman, Clifford Nass, & Joel Slemrod, Using the “Smart Return” to Reduce 
Evasion and Simplify Tax Filing, 69 TAX L. REV. 459, 460 (2016) (outlining recommendations 
relating to increasing the psychological cost of lying and designing customized conversation 
tools); Leslie Book, et al., Insights from Behavioral Economics Can Improve Administration 
of the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV. 177, 234-37 (2018) (suggesting tailored and self-relevant fact 
prompts for software used to prepare earned income tax credit returns); Kathleen Delaney 
Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 56 B.C. L. REV. 617, 648-50 (2015) [hereinafter 
Delaney Thomas I] (recommending measures in electronic returns that would increase the 
“psychic cost” of taxpayer dishonesty); Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 
92 IND. L. J. 1509, 1552 (2017) [hereinafter Delaney Thomas II] (recommending procedural 
simplification reforms such as pre-filling tax returns). 
13 There is a debate as to whether tax compliance robots should be treated as tax preparers. See 
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) (excluding from return preparer a person who only provides “mechanical 
assistance”). Courts’ rejection of the so-called “TurboTax Defense” suggests that they are not 
tax preparers. See Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX 
REV. 443, 484 (2014). However, a Revenue Ruling suggests that tax compliance robots could 
be tax preparers in some cases. See Rev. Rul. 85-187, 1985-2 C.B. 338 (1985) (treating a firm 
that created a software program as a tax preparer on facts that included the firm’s “substantive 
determination” with respect to a depreciation deduction). 
14 See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 151, 192-02 (2017) (suggesting that tax compliance robots such as TurboTax 
should be treated as tax return preparers). Tax preparers face numerous responsibilities under 
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requirements applicable to those who practice before the IRS might be 
extended to tax compliance robots.15 These proposals would impose 
liability for negligent or willful violations, including mistakes of law 
and participation in user fraud. They would also expand taxpayers’ 
ability to avoid penalties by invoking the defense that a tax compliance 
robot gave a certain legal answer. These recommendations, too, are 
supported in part by the fact that tax compliance robots have a 
centralized role in the tax system.  
 
Current law has not adopted these proposals. Thus, the law now rarely 
imposes direct liability on tax compliance robots for legal violations. 
Nevertheless, centralization may encourage tax compliance robots to 
follow the law. A compliance robot’s success is driven by the number 
of customers, or users, it attracts. In other words, the business model 
relies on economies of scale. But if a compliance robot makes errors, it 
will experience negative economies of scale. The more users the robot 
has – or, in other words, the more centralized its decisions -- the more 
likely the errors will be found out. And even if the law does not 
impose direct liability on tax compliance robots for errors of law, the 
market may penalize such robots for legal errors. 
 
Centralization may encourage tax compliance robots to follow the law, 
but they do not always do so. Tax compliance robots provide a good 
 
the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2015) (imposing penalties on tax 
preparers for certain understatements of tax liability, for instance if an undisclosed position 
lacks substantial authority and the preparer “knew (or reasonably should have known) of the 
position”); I.R.C. § 6695(g) (2018) (imposing on tax preparers diligence requirements relating 
to eligibility for benefits including the earned income tax credit); I.R.C. § 6701 (2015) 
(imposing on tax preparers civil liability for aiding and abetting fraudulent understatements of 
tax). 
15 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: MAKING THE EITC WORK 
FOR TAXPAYERS AND THE GOVERNMENT, 3 SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 24-25, n. 106 (2019) 
(detailing IRS efforts to persuade preparers to voluntarily subject themselves to Circular 230 
after litigation concluded that the IRS lacked the statutory authority to impose minimum 
standards for tax preparers) (citing Loving v. I.R.S., 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 
742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, I.R.S. 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶¶ 1.09, 7B.19, 7B.21 (2nd ed. 2002 & supp. 2019) (listing and 
explaining duties for such practitioners, civil penalties for persons who practice before the 
service, and sanctions for violating Circular 230) (citing 31 C.F.R. § 10.50). Prohibited 
behavior under Circular 230 includes “willfully assisting or suggesting to a client to violate 
any revenue laws of the United States” and “willfully disclosing tax return information in a 
way not authorized by the Code or contrary to a court order.” 
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comparative case study because these robots break some laws, like the 
upselling bans and taxpayer confidentiality requirements contained in 
the FreeFile agreement with the IRS. Tax compliance robots also may 
subtly encourage user fraud. On the other hand, tax compliance robots 
appear to follow the substantive tax law, and even entrench 
government interpretations in their software. Why is there a 
difference? Market incentives provide the answer. 
 
b. Breaking Procedural Tax Law Makes Money 
 
As an example of tax compliance robot lawbreaking, consider the so-
called “Free File” agreement between tax compliance robot makers 
(including Intuit) and the government.16 Tax compliance companies 
including H&R Block and Intuit (the maker of TurboTax) first entered 
into an agreement about free electronic filing with the government in 
2002.17 It consists of a memorandum of understanding in which the 
government pledges not to establish a free tax filing or auto-filled 
return program for many taxpayers, and in exchange H&R Block, 
Intuit and other companies agree to provide free tax filing for a large 
majority of taxpayers, namely those with adjusted gross income “equal 
to or less than 70 percent of all United States (U.S.) taxpayers.”18 This 
income threshold translates to $66,000 in 2019.19 
 
 
 
 
16 See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, The Failed Free File Program Should Be Reformed, Not 
Codified, 160 TAX NOTES 317 (2018) (detailing upselling abuses, privacy violations, and 
deceptive removal of arbitration and other legal rights by companies such as Intuit and H&R 
Block in connection with their obligation to provide free filing alternatives to low-income 
taxpayers). 
17 See Free Online Electronic Tax Filing Agreement (October 20, 2002), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2002-free-online-electronic-tax-filing-agreement.pdf 
(agreement between the Internal Revenue Service and the Free File Alliance, LLC); see also 
Gerald H. Goldberg, Comment, in HENRY J. AARON & JOEL SLEMROD, THE CRISIS IN TAX 
ADMINISTRATION 138, 139 (2004) (“Can a hybrid government-private sector approach, now in 
evidence for 2003 with the IRS and the Free File Alliance ... offer a model that meets taxpayer 
expectations? It is noteworthy that these expectations focus not only on no-cost filing options 
but also on options that do not require the disclosure of confidential financial and tax 
information to private sector companies.”). 
18 Eighth Memorandum of Understanding on Service Standards and Disputes Between the 
Internal Revenue Service and Free File, Incorporated § 1.2 (Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter MOU], 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/Eight%20Free%20File%20MOU.pdf. 
19 About the Free File Program, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/e-file-providers/about-the-free-
file-program [https://perma.cc/L3LW-PX23].  
286 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.1 
 
 
 
The MOU, now in its 8th amended iteration, places a list of 
requirements on the tax filing companies. These include promises to 
faithfully direct taxpayers to free software instead of upselling and 
promises to keep taxpayer information confidential. For instance, 
programs “must clearly list their free customer service options” 
through their landing page.20 Also, if a taxpayer is ineligible for a 
provider’s Free File alternative, the taxpayer is supposed to be 
“directed back to the IRS Free File Landing Page as the first and most 
prominent alternative action so that they may immediately consider 
other Free File offers.”21 
 
Persuasive evidence, some gathered by ProPublica,22 indicates that 
TurboTax and H&R Block Online violated the FreeFile agreement’s 
upselling provisions. Several class action lawsuits allege breach of 
contract and violation of consumer protection, false advertising, and 
unfair competition law.23 The Los Angeles City Attorney has also filed 
two lawsuits, one against H&R Block and one against Intuit, alleging a 
violation of California’s unfair competition statute.24 
 
Other evidence suggests that tax compliance robots violated other 
rules incorporated into the FreeFile MOU, such as requirements to 
protect taxpayer confidentiality as a tax preparer would.25 For instance, 
company use of taxpayer data for broad and unspecified purposes is 
made a condition of service, which is prohibited by incorporated 
 
 
 
 
20 MOU, supra note 18, at § 4.15.4. 
21 MOU, supra note 18, at § 4.19.2(iii). 
22 See Justin Elliott, TurboTax Deliberately Hid Its Free File Page from Search Engines, 
PROPUBLICA, (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/turbotax-deliberately-hides-
its-free-file-page-from-search-engines. 
23 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Sinohui v. Intuit Inc., 
No.5:19-cv02546 (N.D. Ca. May 12, 2019); First Amended Complaint, Olosoni v. HRB Tax 
Group, Inc., No.3:19-cv-0361-SK (N.D. Ca. Aug. 9, 2019). 
24 See, e.g., Complaint, People v. Intuit Inc., No. 19STCV15644 (Superior Ct. of Calif, County 
of Los Angeles, May 6, 2019) (alleging violation of California Law Unfair Business & 
Professions Code § 17200 et seq.). 
25 See MOU, supra note 18, at § 4.12 (providing that “Members shall only use or disclose the 
tax return data Members collect … in accordance with the provisions of Section 7216 of the 
Code.”). 
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regulatory provisions.26 Also, consent waivers are broader than the law 
allows.27  
 
Upselling produces revenue. So does the use of customer data. The 
annual reports of tax compliance robots’ business say this plainly. 
H&R Block explains: “There can be no assurance that we will be able 
to ... effectively ensure the migration of clients from our free tax 
service offerings to those for which we receive fees.”28 Intuit states: 
“We also provide additional customer benefits by utilizing customer 
data available to us through our existing offerings. If we are not able to 
develop and clearly demonstrate the value of new or upgraded 
products or services to our customers, or effectively utilize our 
customers’ data, our revenues may be harmed.”29 Tax compliance 
robots’ incentive to earn revenue and profit are directly at odds with 
the MOU’s restrictions on upselling and requirements to safeguard 
taxpayer data. 
 
c. Compliance Robots Do Not Encourage Honesty 
 
Another feature of tax compliance robots that may make them more 
profitable is that they do not police user lies. The mechanism here is 
different – it presumably involves taxpayers’ willingness to pay for a 
product that will help them reduce their tax bill by allowing them to 
adjust factual inputs. Studies show that some features of tax 
compliance software systems, such as the constant display of a ‘tax 
due’ bar, may encourage taxpayers to lie, for instance by overstating 
business expenses or understating cash income.30 This effect has been 
 
 
 
 
26 See Ventry, supra note 16, at 322-25. 
27 Id.      
28 H&R BLOCK., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 23, 55 (2018), https://investors.hrblock.com/static-
files/4293dedf-951d-4541-b4a8-ac80daded417.  
29 INTUIT INC., FISCAL 2018 FORM 10-K 13 (2018),  
https://s23.q4cdn.com/935127502/files/doc_financials/annual/2018-Annual-Report-on-Form-
10-K-(PDF).pdf. 
30 See Soled & Thomas, supra note 14, at 180-81 (summarizing results). 
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reported particularly if a change reduces a tax liability;31 not so much 
if it increases a refund due.32  
 
It would be possible to change the design of tax compliance robots so 
as to encourage taxpayer honesty. Measures like more pre-filling of 
tax returns might reduce the effort taxpayers must expend in order to 
tell the truth on their returns.33 Tax preparation software could “force 
taxpayers to lie by commission, rather than omission” and could 
require attestations of honesty at more salient points in the tax 
preparation process.34 It could provide users with fraud alerts 
prompted by repeated deletion and re-entry of figures. 
 
But it makes sense that tax compliance robots do not police user fraud, 
because the market and the IRS treat users’ factual inputs as specific to 
that user. No legal or market penalty falls on TurboTax if its software 
design subtly encourages a taxpayer to underreport cash income or 
exaggerate charitable deductions. Neither the market nor the law 
constrain tax compliance robots’ decisions about how to request and 
receive factual inputs. They lack an incentive to encourage honesty.  
d. Following Substantive Tax Law Apparently Makes Money  
 
Yet when it comes to substantive tax law – as opposed to the law 
governing taxpayer data use or taxpayer fraud – tax compliance robots 
do seem to follow the law. Here, the profit-maximizing strategy 
 
 
 
 
31 See William D. Brink & Lorraine D. Lee, The Effect of Tax Preparation Software on Tax 
Compliance: A Research Note, 27 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 121, 131 (2015) (explaining that 
subjects reported considerably less cash tip income when a tax-due bar displayed). 
32 See Nicholas C. Hunt & Govind S. Iyer, The Effect of Tax Position and Personal Norms: An 
Analysis of Taxpayer Compliance Decisions Using Paper and Software, 41 ADVANCES 
ACCT’G 1, 5 (2018) (finding that when taxpayers observe a refund-due bar, “even low personal 
norm taxpayers … report amounts that are not significantly different from high personal norm 
taxpayers”). 
33 See DeLaney Thomas II, supra note 12, at 1539-44 (explaining different levels of taxpayer 
effort).    
34 Bankman, Nass, & Slemrod, supra note 12, at 460 (outlining recommendations relating to 
increasing the psychological cost of lying and designing customized conversation tools); see 
also Delaney Thomas I, supra note 12, at 648-50 (2015) (recommending measures in 
electronic returns that would increase the “psychic cost” of taxpayer dishonesty); DeLaney 
Thomas II, supra note 12, at 1553-35 (recommending third-party reporting). 
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appears to be to adopt safe legal interpretations, which minimize the 
chance of audit and potential liability or reputational harm. There is a 
parallel with other centralized enforcement frameworks in tax law, 
such as third-party reporting and withholding,35 the reportable 
transactions framework aimed at tax shelter transactions,36 and the 
TEFRA partnership audit model. In each case, a centralized market 
player bears responsibility for making legal decisions. 
 
The centralization of a tax compliance robot may make enforcement 
easier, but as the above examples of violations of taxpayer data law 
and taxpayer fraud law show, centralization does not always produce 
legal compliance. Yet tax compliance robots do seem to follow the 
substantive tax law. They behave as if they will suffer costs if they 
offer substantive tax law interpretations that are too aggressive.  
 
One might think that tax compliance robots follow substantive tax law 
because user contracts cause such robots to bear the costs of 
noncompliance. Some tax compliance robots assume contractual 
responsibilities for tax filing mistakes, typically those that result 
“solely” from “calculation” errors.37 But these contracts do not amount 
to much. The accuracy guarantees are subject to exclusions, such as 
the lack of coverage if an error results from taxpayer inputs; 
limitations, such as dollar limits of $10,000 or less; and arbitration 
 
 
 
 
35 Third-party reporting and withholding has an overwhelming effect on collections. Only 1% 
of income subject to “substantial” third-party reporting and withholding, including wage 
income, goes unreported. This compares to 19% of income subject to “some” reporting, such 
as partnership income; and as much as 63% of income subject to “little or no” reporting, such 
as farm income and nonfarm sole proprietor income. See IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX 
YEARS 2008-2010 5 (2019), available at 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%2
02010.pdf. 
36See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6700, 6701 (imposing reporting responsibilities and, in certain 
circumstances, large penalties directly on “tax shelter promoters” and “material advisers” who 
develop and market schemes to reduce tax). 
37 See, e.g., Intuit Software End User License Agreement: TurboTax Desktop Software – Tax 
Year 2018, INTUIT TURBOTAX (B)(4) (Aug. 2018), 
https://turbotax.intuit.com/corp/license/prior-year/desktop.jsp [https://perma.cc/PJ76-5NWU] 
(explaining TurboTax Accurate Calculation Guarantee). 
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clauses.38 Other commentators have suggested that the guarantees are 
unlikely to expose tax compliance robots to material liability.39 The 
information available in company reports seems consistent with this 
prediction. In 2018, H&R Block reported about $2.4 billion in tax 
preparation fees and royalties and only a $9.4 million liability related 
to estimated losses under its accuracy guarantee program.40  
 
Instead, the reason that tax compliance robots follow the tax law has to 
do with the market. Market or customer expectations apparently 
impose costs on tax compliance robots if they adopt aggressive legal 
interpretations. Part of what a tax compliance robot tries to sell is the 
peace of mind that the government won’t audit tax returns that the 
robot prepares.  
 
In other words, tax compliance robots sell accuracy and expertise.41 
Their product is compliance and legality.42 If they program the law 
aggressively, taxpayers may be audited, causing the robots’ reputation 
 
 
 
 
38 See, e.g., id. at (A)(13) (requiring arbitration); see also Mock & Shurtz, supra note 13, at 
490-94 (describing H&R Block and TurboTax software). 
39 See, e.g., Mock & Shurtz, supra note 13, at 494 (arguing that “the utility of these accuracy 
guarantees is questionable” and that when software errors are made “through no fault of the 
taxpayer, the accuracy-related penalty should be waived by the IRS”). However the IRS 
generally does not waive penalties when the taxpayer raises this so-called “TurboTax 
Defense.” See id. at 494-505 (analyzing cases).  
40 H&R BLOCK, supra note 28, at 23, 55 (2018), https://investors.hrblock.com/static-
files/4293dedf-951d-4541-b4a8-ac80daded417 (reporting revenue breakdown and estimated 
losses due to accuracy guarantee). 
41 See, e.g., H&R BLOCK, supra note 28, at 12-13 (“The unpredictable nature, timing and 
effective dates of changes to tax laws and tax forms can result in condensed development 
cycles for our tax services and product offerings because our clients expect high levels of 
accuracy…. [S]ignificant problems with such offerings or the manner in which we provide 
them to our clients may harm our revenue, results of operations, and reputation.”); INTUIT INC., 
supra note 29, at 19 (explaining that errors could also affect our reputation, the willingness of 
customers to use our products, and our financial results”); Mock & Shurtz, supra note 13, at 
463-64 (describing Intuit and H&R Block advertising spending);. 
42 One small lab study compared TurboTax results with results “determined by consensus of 
two tax professors and one tax instructor” and reported that using TurboTax improved 
taxpayer compliance for both novice and experienced tax preparers. Tracy Noga & Vicky 
Arnold, Do Tax Decision Support Systems Affect the Accuracy of Tax Compliance Decisions?, 
3 INT’L J. ACCT. INFO. SYS. 125, 130-133 (2002).  
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and profit to suffer.43 On the other hand, if they program the law to 
minimize the risk of audit, then the taxpayer may sometimes pay more 
in taxes than required by the law, but the government will not object to 
the mistake and the taxpayer may not notice it. 
 
With respect to substantive tax law, tax compliance robots comply – 
that is, they arrange their systems to “confor[m] to applicable rules and 
regulations.”44 But there is no reason to assume that tax compliance 
robots comply for the sake of compliance. Rather, they presumably 
comply in order to maximize profit. As to how they comply, as 
discussed further in Part II, it appears that tax compliance robots 
follow government guidance to the letter in easy cases and adopt 
positions that minimize audit risk in harder cases. 
 
III. How Tax Compliance Robots Follow the Law 
 
a. Easy Case Compliance: Follow Government Guidance  
 
Tax compliance is more straightforward where there are clear ex ante 
rules. If the tax compliance robot does what government guidance 
says, the government will accept its legal interpretations. This is not 
tautological, since government guidance could get the law wrong.  
 
 
 
 
43 Cf. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 682-85 (2012) (suggesting that the reputation market for large banks 
provides an incentive for such banks to comply with a tax reporting rule, if enough banks 
comply to start a “virtuous circle” of signaling). 
44 GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE 3 (2014). On one hand, definitions of compliance tend to be more expansive than 
that offered here because they consider the problem within the context of a “complex 
institution” that complies through internal control mechanisms. Id. at 137. On the other hand, 
other definitions of compliance differ from that offered here because they state the goal of 
compliance as adhering to law or norms, rather than minimizing the risk of loss. The 
advantage of stating the goal as minimizing the risk of loss is that it provides a better tool to 
understand hard cases, such as cases where compliance with one law makes compliance with 
another law impossible, cases where any interpretation of an unclear law results in a risk of 
loss, or cases where the benefits of noncompliance materially exceed the costs of 
noncompliance.  
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However, the IRS generally stands by its guidance when auditing 
returns.45  
 
The prediction that tax compliance robots generally follow IRS 
guidance is consistent with available evidence. Automated tax 
products like TurboTax import the content of IRS forms and 
instructions in their software.46 A study of the process of implementing 
the 2017 tax statute shows that the legislative drafters design statutes 
with tax software firms, rather than human readers, in mind.47  
 
Sometimes, a tax compliance robot’s legal error is discovered. An 
example is the apparently missing self-employment tax prompt 
exposed when Timothy Geithner was nominated to serve as Treasury 
Secretary in 2008.48 In that case, the software apparently promptly 
fixed its mistake.49 
 
 
 
 
45 See I.R.S., CHIEF COUNSEL NOTICE CC-2003-014, FOLLOWING PUBLISHED GUIDANCE IN 
ADVICE AND LITIGATION (May 8, 2003) (requiring that litigation legal positions must be 
consistent with published guidance including “final regulations, temporary regulations, 
revenue rulings, revenue procedures, IRB notices, and announcements”); see generally DAVID 
M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 31-32 (2d ed. 
2008) (discussing the goal of IRS consistency, the internal review processes designed to 
achieve it, and some case law holding the government to its position as stated in, for instance, 
a Revenue Ruling).  
46 See Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law, 66 
EMORY L. J. 189, 229-31 (2017) (giving examples of TurboTax repeating government 
guidance verbatim).  
47 See Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Constituencies and Control in Statutory Drafting: 
Interviews With Government Tax Counsels, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1291, 1314, 1316-18 (2019) 
(reporting that 26 lengthy interviews with statutory drafters revealed that statutes were not 
written for the audience of taxpayers themselves) (“A couple of interviewees indicated that the 
primary goal was to articulate a statute so that software companies such as TurboTax could 
effectively write a program that implemented the rule that could be used by a large number of 
taxpayers.”). 
48 Mock & Shurtz, supra note 13, at 486. 
49 See Mock & Shurtz, supra note 13, at 486-490 (describing prompt fixes related to self-
employment tax omission, disallowance of gambling losses, and treatment of real estate 
activity under passive activity loss rules). Perhaps tax software providers also take note of 
mistakes discovered by diligent law professors. See Bryan Camp, Lesson for Tax Day: When 
Tax Prep Software Gets It Wrong, TAXPROF BLOG (April 15, 2019), 
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/04/lesson-for-tax-day-when-tax-prep-software-
gets-it-wrong.html (describing H&R Block software’s failure to ask whether tuition amounts 
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When tax compliance robots conform to government guidance, they 
replicate the weaknesses of that guidance, since the robots’ motive is 
not to improve the quality of the law, but rather to maximize profit and 
revenue. A tax compliance robot complies in order to avoid 
government challenge, on the theory that avoiding audit will maintain 
customer trust and revenue. If the government’s guidance is 
overgenerous to taxpayer, the robot’s programming is overgenerous to 
taxpayers.50 If the government’s guidance is not generous enough, the 
robot’s programming is under-generous as well.51  
 
b. Examples of Errors in Favor of the Government 
 
Work done by the National Taxpayer Advocate has revealed instances 
where tax compliance robots appear to err in favor of the 
government.52 These errors are consistent with the idea that tax 
compliance robots prefer to minimize audit risk. Perhaps they also 
suggest that some tax compliance robots prefer to avoid the costs of 
programming the correct implementation of new and complex 
provisions of law. 
 
In several contexts, tests run by the National Taxpayer Advocate show 
that some tax compliance robots fail to prompt taxpayers for 
information that could allow them to claim valuable deductions or 
 
were funded out of § 529 plans for purposes of calculating the American Opportunity Tax 
Credit). 
50 For example, tax compliance robots treat loyalty points earned by employees as nontaxable, 
presumably because I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621 states the 
government’s decision not to enforce I.R.C. § 61 with respect to frequent flyer miles earned by 
employees. The stronger statutory interpretation is that such employee miles and similar 
loyalty points are taxable. Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the 
Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L. J. 829, 831-32 (2012). 
51 For example, TurboTax repeats IRS guidance that states that refinancing points can be 
amortized over the loan term, despite conflicting case law. See Blank & Osofsky, supra note 
46, at 211, 230, (comparing TurboTax guidance to case law) (citing Huntsman v. 
Commissioner, 905 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1990), rev’d, IRS Action on Decision 1991-02 (Feb. 
11, 1991) (stating that IRS would not follow decision outside the 8th Circuit but 
recommending against request for certiorari). 
52 Thanks to Professor Leslie Book for bringing the details of this work to my attention. 
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other benefits.53 For example, in 2006, some tax compliance robots did 
not include prompts to allow users to claim increased tax benefits for 
casualty losses resulting from Hurricane Katrina.54 As another 
example, in 2015, when the tax system began to administer a portion 
of the Affordable Care Act, some software programs did not prompt 
taxpayers for information, such as facts supporting eligibility for a 
hardship exemption, that would have reduced their health insurance-
related payment obligation.55  
 
c. Frame Factual Inputs to Reduce Audit Risk 
 
One small test carried out by this author also suggests that sometimes 
tax compliance robots limit users’ choices. Perhaps they do so both to 
avoid the necessity of programming a complex set of factual inputs, 
and/or to produce a legal position less likely to be audited. The small 
test devised for this illustration in this essay assumed a taxpayer who 
receives payments in exchange for donating blood plasma. These 
payments are gross income, 56 subject to debates about basis recovery 
and capital asset status.57 But available authorities do not sort out 
related issues such as whether such payments should be treated as self-
employment income58 for purposes of the self-employment tax59 
and/or the earned income tax credit.60 
 
 
 
 
53 See 1 TAS ANN. REP. 75 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 TAS Rep.] (reporting that some Free File 
tax compliance robots did not support Schedule C depreciation and/or claims for casualty loss 
or disaster relief). 
54 Hearing on Tax Return Preparation Options for Taxpayers Before the Sen. Comm. on Fin., 
109th CONG. 13-14 (2006) (statement of Nina E. Olson, Taxpayer Advocate, Taxpayer 
Advocate Serv.) (reporting that TurboTax and six other sites correctly calculated Hurricane 
Katrina casualty loss benefits but that twelve other sites did not calculate the benefits correctly 
and instead imposed generally applicable limitations which had been statutorily suspended for 
Hurricane Katrina losses). 
55 See 1 TAS ANN. REP. 170 n.20 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 TAS Rep.] . 
56 Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1232-34 (1980). 
57 Cf. Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1986) (denying charitable 
deduction for donated blood under an analysis that turned on capital asset treatment and 
explaining that “[t]axpayers have proffered no evidence as to any basis in the donated blood” 
or the holding period of the property). 
58 See Larry Zelenak, The Body in Question: The Income Tax and Human Body Materials, 80 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 80-82 (2017) (explaining that the author’s recommended treatment 
of human body materials as capital assets would result in no application of the self-
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A “recommended answer” from a TurboTax employee does not reveal 
any of this nuance.61 It advises reporting the income from plasma 
donations as if reported on a 1099-MISC.62 The instructions to IRS 
Form 1099-MISC provide that “[a]mounts shown may be subject to 
self-employment tax.”63 Yet a TurboTax user who follows the 
answer’s instructions will discover that the income is not reported as 
self-employment income or earned income.   
 
If the TurboTax miscellaneous income treatment of payments for 
blood plasma always increased tax liability, one could call it the 
“safer” legal position for that reason. But it doesn’t. The miscellaneous 
income treatment might result in higher income tax than would result 
from treating blood plasma as a capital asset, but this treatment also 
decreases self-employment tax liability. One might think that a safer, 
more audit-proof approach would therefore suggest to taxpayers that 
payments received for blood plasma count as self-employment 
income. 
 
Yet if TurboTax engaged users in the question of whether payments 
for plasma were self-employment income, it would get into earned 
income tax credit territory.64 In some cases, blood plasma donations 
treated as self-employment income might allow a taxpayer to claim 
 
employment tax, but that statements in case law regarding the treatment of donations as 
inventory or services suggest that donors should pay the self-employment tax).  
59 The self-employment tax includes Social Security and Medicare portions and is imposed at 
a total rate of 15.3%. See I.R.C. § 1401 (2014). Half of the tax—the amount equivalent to the 
employer’s portion—is deductible above the line. I.R.C. § 164(f) (2017). 
60 “Earned income” for purposes of the earned income tax credit includes net earnings from 
self-employment, as defined in I.R.C. § 1402(a), and is not reduced by the I.R.C. § 164(f) 
deduction for the employer portion of self-employment taxes. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2) (2015); I.R.S., 
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUBLICATION 596: EARNED INCOME CREDIT 7, 18 (2019). 
61 Bs.ford & Deeee, Plasma Donation as Taxable Income, Intuit Turbo: Real Money Talk 
(June 7, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://ttlc.intuit.com/questions/2342656-plasma-donation-as-
taxable-income [https://perma.cc/AT92-SMG7]. 
62 Id.  
63 I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OMB NO. 1545-0115, FORM 1099-MISC (2019). 
64 Cf. Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, And Those Who Know 
Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. TAX 
REV. 113, 150-51 (2013) (explaining the Tax Court’s rejection of a good faith defense based 
on TurboTax software). 
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earned income tax credit benefits,65 and EITC audit rates are high.66 
Suggesting that a user might claim additional EITC benefits likely 
carries a higher chance of controversy, and so the high EITC audit rate 
may favor the decision to frame blood plasma payments as 
miscellaneous, not self-employment, income.  
 
Of course, it is impossible to know exactly why the blood plasma 
hypothethical works out as it does when it is tested in TurboTax. 
Perhaps the miscellaneous income recommendation resulted from the 
unreviewed work of a single TurboTax employee. It may not have 
involved any larger consideration of audit risk. In other words, there is 
no proof that the answer was chosen because it reduces audit risk. 
Nevertheless, that speculation is consistent with the other small test 
run for purposes of this essay. The second test, described below, 
involves the allocation of second-home expenses. 
 
d. Allow Non-IRS Approach if No Chance of Government 
Challenge 
 
In contrast, another small test by this author suggests that sometimes a 
tax compliance robot faced with uncertainty does give taxpayers a 
choice about what position to take. TurboTax does this, for instance, 
with respect to allocating mortgage interest and property taxes 
between, on one hand, personal deductions or, on the other hand, 
above-the-line deductions against rent received for use of a second 
home.67 The program explains that the “IRS Method” allocates these 
taxes pro rata based on the number of days rented divided by the total 
number of days rented and used, while the “Tax Court Method” 
 
 
 
 
65 Taxpayers in the EITC phase-in range (for instance, with income not exceeding $14,570 
assuming two or three children in 2019, see Rev. Proc. 2018-57) have credit percentages of 
34%, 40% or 45%. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1) (2015). In this range, the EITC advantage would exceed 
the self-employment tax disadvantage of treating a blood plasma donation income as self-
employment income. 
66 See 2015 TAS Rep., supra note 55, at 249 (“EITC audits make up 35 percent of all IRS 
audits despite the fact that EITC returns account for only 19 percent of all returns filed.”). 
67 See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2018) (allowing mortgage interest itemized deduction); I.R.C. § 164(a) 
(2017) (allowing state and local taxes as itemized deduction). 
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allocates these taxes based on the number of days rented divided by 
the number of days in the year.68  
  
The IRS Method benefits some taxpayers; the Tax Court Method 
benefits other taxpayers.69 TurboTax defaults to the IRS Method, 
which presumably eliminates the risk of audit on that legal issue. Yet it 
does not insist that taxpayers follow that approach. This departs from 
the program’s usual approach of following the government’s guidance. 
 
The software’s decision on this point can be explained by the strength 
of the authority supporting the Tax Court Method. In the early 1980s, 
the Ninth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit each upheld the Tax Court 
Method and invalidated a contrary proposed Treasury regulation.70 
Then, a 1990 internal IRS communication refused to raise the issue 
again in litigation,71 which suggests that the government would not 
challenge the Tax Court method on audit. Thus this small test suggests 
that when a tax compliance robot gives a user this choice about 
expense allocation, it does not sacrifice the system goal of minimizing 
audit risk. 
 
 
 
 
68 A pop-up window in the program explains, “The Tax Court allows a different allocation 
formula for interest and taxes than the one the IRS describes in Publication 527. Under the 
Tax Court formula, interest and taxes are allocated on a daily basis, that is, the rental portion is 
the ratio of days rented to the number of days in the year. Under the IRS formula, interest and 
taxes are allocated in the ratio of days rented to days used. The Tax Court ratio results in a 
smaller amount of interest and taxes allocated to the rental property.” (software on file with 
author).  
69 The IRS Method uses a smaller denominator and thus would allocate more mortgage 
interest and property tax expenses to the rental income. This is advantageous for a taxpayer if 
the rental income is large enough to absorb all of the rental deductions as above-the-line 
expenses. But if the rental deductions exceed the rental income, it may be more advantageous 
for the taxpayer to claim the mortgage interest and property tax deductions as personal 
deductions. 
70 Bolton v. Comm’r, 694 F.2d 556, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1982); McKinney v. Comm’r, 732 F.2d 
414, 416 (10th Cir. 1983); Income Tax: Deductions for Business Use or Rental of Dwelling 
Unit, 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (proposed Aug. 7, 1980). 
71 I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CC:TL-8915-90, NON DOCKETED SERVICE ADVICE REVIEW 
(1990) (addressed to “District Counsel Philadelphia” from “Assistant Chief Counsel (Tax 
Litigation))” (“Because of the adverse decisions in the Tax Court and in the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits, and because the regulation upon which the Service's position is based has not been 
finalized, we suggest you do not pursue this matter [of allocating interest and property taxes 
according to IRS method] at this time.”). 
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IV. Implications for Legal Design 
 
a) Control and Penalties 
 
The description here of compliance robots suggests that sometimes 
they may break the law, as with taxpayer confidentiality and data law 
incorporated into the Free File agreement. Sometimes they sidestep or 
claim little involvement with the law, as with the laws prohibiting 
taxpayer fraud. Sometimes they follow the law or even overcomply, as 
with substantive tax law. 
 
The law faces at least two questions when it comes to regulating tax 
compliance robots. One question is control. To what extent will the 
law control or direct the decisions taken by the robot? Another 
question is penalties. If a tax compliance robot acts illegally, should 
and will it be penalized under the law?  
 
The case study in this paper reveals a diversity of experience with 
respect to tax compliance robots. In the current environment, where 
very little direct legal liability has attached to any violation of law by a 
tax compliance robot, such robots follow some laws and break others. 
The market works with the law in some cases, like substantive tax law 
compliance. The market works against the law in other cases, like 
taxpayer data law compliance. The control and penalty choices the law 
makes for tax compliance robots might take these market factors into 
account. 
 
In cases where market forces encourage robots to violate the law, 
tighter control and/or larger penalties can bring compliance robots into 
line. But where market forces prompt robots to comply or overcomply 
with the law, penalizing robots for undercompliance is likely to 
decrease the quality of the law. One can observe compliance robot 
outcomes influenced by important non-legal factors such as the market 
in which the robot operates. Because these non-legal factors have 
different impacts in different situations, legal design might respond 
differently depending on the context. If the market encourages legal 
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violations, control and/or punishment is an appropriate response, but if 
the market encourages compliance, then control and/or punishment is 
less appropriate. 
 
b) Addressing Taxpayer Data Violations Under Free File 
 
Recall that algorithmic tax compliance robots such as TurboTax 
appear to violate taxpayer data provisions in the FreeFile agreement. 
This can be explained because, first, the taxpayer data provisions of 
the Free File agreement have not been enforced and, second, breaking 
taxpayer data law increases the revenue of tax compliance robots.72 In 
this case, the law faces a market that produces legal violations. Legal 
design solutions might increase control of compliance robots and/or 
penalties for robots’ violations of law. The legal design choices 
include (but are not limited to) regulation and enforcement by the 
government. 
 
The tax compliance robot, its user, and the government are three 
participants in the drama of tax compliance set out here. In the case of 
these violations of taxpayer data law, the tax compliance robot’s 
interest in breaking the law to increase revenue is set against the user’s 
interest and the government’s interest in protecting taxpayer data. One 
implication is that the law might look to either users or the government 
for enforcement. 
 
Current law under the Free File agreement provides a framework for 
government to increase its control of or penalties imposed on Free File 
violations. The existing Free File agreement between the government 
and software providers prescribes extreme remedies for breach – 
removal of a member from the Free File alliance or termination of the 
contract. It thus gives the government a broad ability to negotiate when 
a counterparty firm breaches the agreement, because the government 
can threaten to cancel the agreement, develop its own software, and 
compete with the tax preparation firms.73 Various political and 
 
 
 
 
72 See supra text accompanying notes 22-29. 
73 See INTUIT INC., supra note 29, at 13 (“If the Free File Program were to be terminated and 
the IRS were to enter the software development and return preparation space, the federal 
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institutional reasons might explain why the government has been 
unwilling to use this negotiation threat to force the Free File 
companies to faithfully serve the goals of the program. One reason 
may be that tax administrators are not used to having to force such 
firms to comply with the law.  
 
One possibility to address the lack of enforcement with respect to 
taxpayer data is simply to call for the government to do its job. Several 
commentators have made this point,74 and properly so. But it is also 
important to acknowledge that legal design options for controlling and 
penalizing compliance robots need not require government to make the 
first move. Users might also detect and publicize violations of law. It 
turns out that there are several avenues. Some are extralegal, such as 
media attention. Some work through legislative processes, including 
Congressional oversight. Other avenues involve litigation, whether 
through qui tam or whistleblower suits75 or through impact litigation. 
As described above, several class action and government lawsuits 
claim that alleged Free File data and confidentiality violations break 
state consumer protection, false advertising, and unfair competition 
law.76  
 
The example of Free File data and confidentiality violations raises a 
more general question about tax compliance robots. Should avenues 
for challenging such robots’ decisions other than government 
enforcement be available? The example illustrates a situation where 
the market produces legal violations, presenting law with the problem 
of how to respond. Especially in a highly regulated area, where 
compliance robots are expected to follow intricate regulations, it may 
 
government would become a publicly funded direct competitor of the U.S. tax services 
industry and of Intuit. Government funded services that curtail or eliminate the role of 
taxpayers in preparing their own taxes could potentially have material and adverse revenue 
implications.”). 
74 See, e.g., Ventry, supra note 16, at 319; see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Free File: A Story of 
Agency Capture 4, 9 (April 23, 2019) (working paper, on file with the author) 
75 See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 359 
(2008); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Not Just Whistling Dixie: The Case for Tax Whistleblowers in 
the States, 59 VILL. L. REV. 425, 491-94 (2014); Franziska Hertel, Qui Tam for Tax?: Lessons 
from the States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1898 (2014). 
76 See sources cited supra notes 23-24.      
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seem most natural or comfortable to ask a government agency to 
increase its control or enforcement of the roots.  
 
But the responsible government agency may fail to accomplish this 
task. Legal design options that can limit robots’ illegal actions do not 
always require the government to act first. They may also include 
allowing other legal actions, such as individual and class action 
lawsuits. When should standing, for instance, be expanded to permit 
such litigation? 
 
Expanding standing may make sense if the underlying assumption is 
that the law needs to energetically counteract the market’s tendency to 
break the law. But as the other features of this essay’s case study 
show, compliance robots sometimes break the law but sometimes 
follow it. If standing is expanded generally to help address a situation 
where the market encourages robots to break the law, then the 
resulting broader standing could exacerbate overcompliance and/or 
produce unnecessary transaction costs in situations where the market 
encourages robots to follow the law. 
 
c) Addressing User Fraud 
 
In the case of user fraud, tax compliance robots tend to sidestep the 
legal issue. They do not explicitly encourage user fraud, but features 
like a constantly-adjusting “tax due” figure may increase the 
likelihood that users will lie.77 If neither the market nor the law 
penalizes robots for user lies, they have little incentive to discourage 
fraud.  
 
Addressing user fraud presents a different set of issues compared to 
Free File violations, in part because the avenue to impact litigation is 
narrower. What plaintiff would sue TurboTax on the theory that 
TurboTax let the plaintiff lie, thus reducing the plaintiff’s taxes? The 
persons harmed by user fraud are other taxpayers.78 They stand outside 
 
 
 
 
77 See sources cited supra notes 30-32. 
78 Cf. Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 TAX L.REV. 617, 630-33 (2016). 
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the contractual relationship and traditionally lack standing to claim 
that someone else’s taxes are too low.79  
 
In other words, the legal design question in the case of user fraud is 
different than in the case of Free File data and confidentiality 
obligations. To consider this further, recall the three participants in the 
drama of tax compliance – the government, the tax compliance robot, 
and the taxpayer/user. These three participants are aligned differently 
in the case of user fraud. In contrast to the situation for taxpayer data 
violations, both of the players in the market – the tax compliance robot 
and the user – have similar interests. Fraud helps the user to reduce 
taxes due, and the tax compliance robot’s subtle complicity in the 
effort presumably makes it more popular with its users. 
 
In other words, the user and the robots have aligned incentives when it 
comes to user fraud. A taxpayer/user is unlikely to challenge a tax 
compliance robot’s omission of fraud detection measures in the robot’s 
programming. Instead, the task of incentivizing tax compliance robots’ 
to encourage taxpayer honesty falls to the government. The analysis 
here confirms the importance of others’ recommendations to increase 
tax compliance robots’ responsibility for user honesty. These include 
ideas such as requiring user attestations of truth, facilitating pre-filled 
returns and tailoring factual prompts.80  
 
Another point this case study highlights is that requiring robots to take 
more responsibility for user honesty also raises the question of 
remedies. Should a robot face penalties if the robot’s users persist in 
lying? Questions include the appropriate standard of care,81 and how to 
translate a legal standard of care to the robotic environment.82 
 
 
 
 
79 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-103 (1968); see also Sugin, supra note 78, at 633. 
80 See sources cited supra note 12. 
81 See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-
Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453, 454, 472 (2011) (suggesting that legal uncertainty can 
cause high penalties to over-deter tax noncompliance for risk-averse taxpayers); Kyle D. 
Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 
241, 293-96 (2007) (analyzing strict liability and fault-based tax penalty structures).  
82 If the robot were liable for user lies caused or facilitated by its negligence, then questions 
about how to show reasonableness in coding and data sets arise. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra 
note 7, at 14-17 (describing automatic decisionmaking processes). If the robot were strictly 
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d) Substantive Tax Law Compliance 
 
With respect to substantive tax law compliance, it appears that tax 
compliance robots generally incorporate government regulations and 
guidance into their coding. When they make substantive legal 
mistakes, some evidence suggests that they lean in favor of making 
mistakes that overreport tax liability, so that taxpayers pay too much in 
tax, rather than too little.83  
 
Recall that this compliance with substantive tax law occurs despite the 
absence of any government regulation that explicitly requires tax 
compliance robots to follow the law or penalizes them if they get tax 
law wrong.84 For instance, tax preparer and Circular 230 rules that 
impose penalties for willful or negligent violations of tax law have not 
been applied to tax compliance robots. Still, such robots adopt a risk-
averse view of the law.  
 
The three participants in the drama of tax compliance – government, 
tax compliance robots, and taxpayer-users -- take yet another 
alignment when it comes to substantive tax compliance. Here, the tax 
compliance robot and the government may be aligned in the service of 
following a safe, government-leaning, risk-averse view of the tax law. 
The user is sometimes aligned with the robot and the government, 
since many taxpayers would prefer a return that carries no audit risk. 
Perhaps sometimes, though, the user might prefer a somewhat more 
aggressive view – one that the software does not offer. A user might 
 
liable for user lies, fewer such question arise. See Susan C. Morse, Government-to-Robot 
Enforcement, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1513-16 (2019) (exploring strict liability for 
compliance robots). 
83 See Hearing on Tax Return Preparation Options for Taxpayers Before the Sen. Comm. on 
Fin., supra note 54, at 12-19 .  
84 See 2018 TAS Rep., supra note 53, at 69-70 (detailing lack of oversight except for twice-a-
year technical compliance reviews which confirm certain security, privacy and usability 
features). 
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prefer to claim the larger casualty loss benefit allowed for a Hurricane 
Katrina-related loss, for instance.85 
 
When it comes to substantive tax law, tax compliance robots may 
present the opposite problem in comparison to the problem that is 
presented for Free File data and confidentiality violations. In the Free 
File violations situation, tax compliance robots undercomply with the 
law. They give government (and taxpayers) less confidentiality and 
less data protection than the law requires. But in the case of 
substantive tax law, tax compliance robots overcomply. They give the 
government more tax revenue than the law requires. Higher tax 
revenue results when, for instance, a taxpayer is not given the software 
prompts that would allow the taxpayer to claim the larger tax benefit 
available as a result of hurricane damage.  
 
The idea that government should penalize robots if they cause 
taxpayers to underreport taxes due thus makes less sense for issues of 
substantive tax law compliance. What if market factors alone, without 
any significant help from legal liability, already cause tax compliance 
robots to adopt government-favorable, audit-risk-averse views of the 
tax law? What if tax compliance robots and the government already 
cooperate in the drafting and implementation of tax regulations and 
other guidance? The existing situation might present a problem of 
‘reverse capture,’ in which a market participant leans in favor of the 
government.  
 
This case study suggests that tax compliance robots, for market 
reasons of their own, sometimes pursue a conservative, risk-averse 
view of the tax law. Perhaps users, for collective action and/or other 
reasons, are unable to insist on more taxpayer-friendly legal 
interpretations. Perhaps the law sometimes may face the problem of a 
robot that complies too much, for instance by causing taxpayers to pay 
too much in tax. If this is so, then the law may face the counterintuitive 
 
 
 
 
85 See supra note 54 (explaining National Taxpayer Advocate findings regarding tax 
preparation software’s calculation of expanded casualty loss benefits relating to Hurricane 
Katrina). 
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task of encouraging a robot to produce returns that report less tax 
liability – not more. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Tax compliance robots occupy a central place in the tax system. Their 
legal decisions can materially influence the implementation of law. 
This Essay’s examination of algorithmic tax compliance robots, such 
as TurboTax, reveals a diversity in such robots’ legal decisions. They 
appear to break taxpayer data law, and they do not systematically 
encourage taxpayer honesty. On the other hand, they appear to 
interpret substantive tax law in a way that minimizes audit risk and 
sometimes leans away from taxpayer-favorable presentations of law. 
The market thus presents several compliance and noncompliance 
variations looking for legal design responses. The choices made about 
whether and how to control and penalize tax compliance robots will 
require nuance and variation if they are to fit the diversity of outcomes 
produced by such robots’ operation in their markets.  
 
